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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respor.dent, v. ROBERT L.
HA VEN, Defendant and Appellant.

)

[1] Searches and Seizures-Reasonableness.-An accused makes a
prima facie case that a search and seizure were illegal when
he establishes that they were made without a warrant, and the
burden thereafter rests on the prosecution to show proper
justification.
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant-Probable Cause.-In a narcotics
prosecution, it was not ('~tahli~hed that the officers had probahle
cause to arn'st defendant when they entered his house without
a warrant where their testimony was barren of the details of
information they had received a week or more before the
arrest concerning defendant's narcotic activity, thus making
it impossible for the trial court to determine whether that
information would justify a reasonable belief of defendant's
guilt, where the officers, during their surveillance of defendant's
house a week before the arrest, saw eight persons enter and
leave the house in a 10 to 12 hour period, but six persons lived
in the house and the four or five who were known to have been
engaged in or who were suspected of being engaged in the
narcotics traffic presumably included defendant and his wife,
both of whom had previous narcotics records, and where no
explanation was given for the delay of a week between surveillance and arrest.
[3a,3b] Searches and Seizures-Consent.-In a narcotics prosecution, consent to police officers' entry into defendant's house on
the day of his arrest was not established where it appeared that
an officer, after ringing the bell and knocking but receiving no
response, found the door ajar and entered the house before
defendant or his wife had any opportunity to object, and where
it was probable that he was in the house before they were even
aware of his presence.
[4] Id.-Investigations Falling Short of Search.-The right to seek
interviews with suspects or witnesses at their homes does not
include the right to walk in uninvited merely because there is
no response to a knock or a ring.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 44.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Searches ,and Seizurfls, § 40; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures (1st ed § 71).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 19; [2]
Arrest, § 12(14); [3, ;), 6, 9] Senrchf's and Spizures, ~ 22; [4]
Searches and Seizures, § 6; [7,8] Searches and Seizures, § 24.
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[5] Id.-Oonsent.-Where defendant was suddenly confronted by
five police officers who had entered his house unlawfully, without right or permission, the officers could not rely on defendant's consent to a search of his p<'rson; the substantial
probability that the unlawful entry was essential to sccuring
consent and the inescapable uncertainty whether the consent
was voluntary precluded treating the consent as an independent
valid basis for the ensuing search of defendant's person.
[6] Id.-Oonsent.-A search and seizure made pursuant to consent
secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest is
inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be
segregated therefrom, and is therefore invalid. (Disapproving
language to the contrary in People v. Rayford, 189 Cal.App.2d
474,477 [11 Cal.Rptr. 427] ; People Y. Zavalefa, 182 Cal.App.2d
422, 429 [6 Cal.Rptr. 166); People v. Lucas, 180 Cal.App.2d
723,726-727 [-1 Cnl.Hptr. I!lS]; l'('olile v. [(ii'f!, 175 Cnl.App.2d
386, 389 [346 P.2d 235); People Y. Rodriguez, 168 Cal.App.2d
452, 457 [336 P.2d 266] ; People v. Hicks, 165 Cal.App.2d 548,
550-551 (331 P.2d 1003J ; People \'. I1Ielody, 161 Cal.App.2d 7:!S,
734 [331 P.2d 72).)
[7a, 7b] Id.-Incidental to Arrest.-A search of a hotel room, the
key to which was found in defendant's pocket during a search
of him at his home, was not justified as incidental to defendant's arrest, whether such arrest took place at his house or at
the hotel room, where the hotel room was at a distance from
defendant's house, and where the officers did not take defendant
to the hotel and enter the hotel room to arrest him but to conduct a search, the arrest, which was made after marijuana was
found in the room, thus being at most an incident of the search
and not available as a pretext to justify it.
[8] Id.-Ineidental to Arrest.-When it appears that a search and
not an arrest was the real object of officers in entering on premises, and that the arrest was a pretext for or at the most an
incident of the search, the search is not reasonable within the
meaning of the Constitution.
[9] Id.-Consent.-There was no sufficient showing that defendant
consented to a search of a hotel room, the key to which was
found in his pocket during a search of him at his home, where
defendant's consent to the search at his home was vitiated by
the officers' unlawful entry and did not even purport to authorize the officers to search the hotel room, and where defendant's
attempt 'to divert the officers from the room by walking past
the door of the hotel made it clear that he did not wish the
room searched.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Charles S. Peery, Judge.
Reversed.
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Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment of
conviction reversed.
Russell Bruno, unde! appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John S. McInerny, John
F. Foran and Albert 'V. Harris, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of possession of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code,
section 11530. He admitted a prior conviction of violating
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, and the trial court
sentenced him to prison for the term prescribed by law. He
appeals, cOllh'ndillg tllat the marijuana introduced in evidence
against him was obtained by an illegal search and seizure."
Inspector Kl'rl'igan of the Narcotics Detail of the San Francisco Police Department testified that he received information
that defelldp.nt had nareoties at a house on Army Street. On
September 25, HJ61, be and several other narcotics officers
placed the house uuder surveillance for from 10 to 12 hours.
They observed about eigllt persons, including defendant,
enter and leave. l'''ou1' or five were known to the officers as
having been engaged in narcotics traffic or being suspected
thereof. Defendant testified that the officers entered and
searched the premises on September 25, but found no narcoties and made no arrests. Neither of the officers who testified
mentioned a search on that date.
.A week laL'r, on OctobPr 2, Inspector Kerrigan returned to
the house in the afternoon with Inspector Arieta of the San
Franciseo police, two state narcotics officers, and one federal
narcotics officer. They had no warrant. Inspector Kerrigan
testified that he went to the front door with one of the state
officers. He knocked and rang the bell but received no
answer. The door was open about 2 inches, and he could see
defendant and his wife through a hallway in the kitchen at
the back, of the house. Defendant was sitting at a table and
*The trial court admitted the evidence over objection after a hearing
outside tile presence of the jury. "Thc procedure adopted by the trial
court was proper, for the admissibility of thc evidence presented a question of law for the court." (People v. Goru, 4[) Ca1.2d 776, 780 [291 P.2d
469].)
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his wife was cooking. Inspector Kerrigan push~d the door
open, displayed his badgl', and ~aid, ,. Police Offic~r. I would
like to talk to you." He entl'red the house and defendant
said, " 'What do you wallt~' I a8kl·d him who he was. III'
said, 'Robert Haven.' I said, 'I would like to talk to you.'
He said, "What about?' I said, 'I am a narcotic officer.' "
They went into the living room, and Illsp('ctor Ari('ta and the
state and federal officers then entered the hous('.
Inspector Aricta questioned defendant about narcotics. Ho
testified that defendant told him there were no narcotics in
the house and that he would not keep them there because of
the children and because it was his mother-in-law's house. He
admitted that he had an outfit for taking narcotics and produced it from undl'r a mattress. The officer examined defendant's arm and saw puncture marks. He searched him and
found a key in his pocket with no identifying marks. Defendant told him that he thought it was a key to his mother's
house. The officl'l" asked defl'ndant'8 wife about the key, and
she replied that defendant had a room in a hotel on Mission
Street. Defendant denied any knowledge of a hotel room.
The officers took defendant and his wife in separate cars to
the hotel on Mission Street. Defendant and two officers approached the hotel door, def('ndant walked past it, and one of
the officers called him back. He walked up the stairs with the
officers to room 205, one of the officers opened the door with
the key, and they all entered. The officers found marijuana
in the pocket of a coat in the closet. Inspector Kerrigan
testified that defendant admitted that the coat and marijuana
were his.
Inspector Arieta testified that defendant consented to the
search of his person and to going with the officers to the hote1.
Drfendant testified that he did not consent to the seareh of
his person, that Inspector Arleta ordered him to come with
the officers to the hotel, and that" I didn't argile with him."
He also testified that the coat and marijuana were not his and
denied that he had told the officers that they were.
Defendant contends that the officers' entry into the Army
Street house was unlawful and that therefore the ensuing
st'arches,of his person and of the hotel room were also unlawful whether or not he consented thereto. In any event, he
COil tends that there is no evidence that he consented to the
:';t'IlI'ch of the hotel room. The Attorney Grneral contends
that the officers had probable cause to enter the Army Street
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house to Ill'rl'st defendant, that the search of the hotel room
was justified as incidl'ntal to dl'fl'ndant's al'l'l'st, and that even
if it was IIOt, the marijualla was lawfully obtained pursuant
to defendant's consent.
[!] Defendant made a prima facie ease that the search and
seizure were illegal when 11(' ('stablished that they were made
without a warrant. The bUl'i1t'n then rested on the prosecution
to show proper justification. (Tompkins v. Superior Court,
ante, pp. 65, 67 l27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113] ; Badillo Y.
Supc1'ior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269,272 [294 P.2d 23].)
[2] The prosecution did not establish that the officers
had probable cause to arrest defendant when they entered the
Army Strel't h011se Oil Oeir)ber 2. Their testimony was barren of the details of the information they llad received a week
or more beforl', and it was therl'fore impossible for the trial
court to dl'tl'rmine whether that information would justify a
rcaf!OnabJe bl'lit'f of defendant's guilt. (People v. Boyles, 45
Cal.2d 652,656 [290 P.2d 535] ; People v. Gora, 45 Ca1.2d 776,
782 [291 P.2d 469J.) Nor did their surveillance a week before
the arrest provide reasonable cause. Although eight persons
Wf're seen to enter and IE'ave the house in a 10 to 12-hour
period, six persons lived there including three minor children and def('ndant's wife and mother-in-law. The four or
five who were known to have been engaged in or who were
suspcct('d of being cngaged in the narcotics traffic presumably included defendant and his wife, both of whom had previ(lUS narcotics records.
For all that appears, the others who
werc obs('rved were snspected mE-rely because they came to
the house. Moreover, no explanation was given for the delay
of a week between surveillance and arrest. If, as defendant
testified without contradiction, the officers searched the premis('s on September 25 and found no narcotics, the information
upon which they acted may have been proved false before
tlwy rpturnrd on Octoher 2.
[3a] The prosl'cution also failed to establish consent to
the officers' entry into the house on the day of the arrest.
[4] The right to sel'k interviews with suspects or witnesses
at thf'ir hOllWS dOt>'!; not include the right to walk in uniuvit('d
merely because there is no response to a knock or a ring.
(People v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 753-754 [290 P.2d
832J.) - [3b] In the prescnt case it clearly appears that Inl>pcctor Kerrigan entered the house before defendant or his
wife had auy opportunity to object, and it seems most prob-
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able that he was in the house before they were even aware of
his presence. There is no evidence whatever that they consented to his entry or the entry of the four other officers a fe\v
minutes later.
[5] Since the officers' presence in the house was unlawful,
they could not rely on defendant's consent to search. Since
he was suddenly confronted by five officers who lJad entered
without right or permission, it was equivocal at best whether
Ids apparent consent to being searched was voluntary. The
substantial probability that the unlawful entry was essential
to securing consent and the inescapable uncertainty whether
the consent was voluntary preclude treating the consent as an
independent valid basis for the ensuing search of defendant's person. Accordingly, the consent, the search, the finding
of the key, and the resultillg discovery of the marijuana in
the hotel room were all products of the officers' unlawful
entry and cannot be relied upon to sllstain the judgment.
(Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S.Ot. 407, 416417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441] ; Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660,
662; Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118, 122; United
States v. Watson, 189 F.Supp. 776, 7S1; People v. Wilson,
145 Oal.App.2d 1, 7 [301 P.2d 974] ; cf. People Y. Burch, 196
Oal.App.2d 754, 767 [17 Oal.Rptr. 102]; see also Jackson, J.,
concurring in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459
[69 S.Ot. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158J ; Britt v. Superior Coud, 58
Oa1.2d 469, 473 [24 Oal.Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817] ; People v.
Dixon, 46 Oa1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557J ; Badillo v. Superior
Court, 46 Oa1.2d 269,273 [294 P.2d23].)
[6] It is true that there is language in several cases to
the effect that a search or seizure made pursuant to consent is
valid even though the consent was given immediately after
an unlawful entry or arrest. (People v. Rayford, 189 Oal.
App.2d 474, 477 [11 Oa1.Rptr. 427] ; People v. Zavaleta, 182
Oal.App.2d 422, 429 [6 Oal.Rptr. 166] ; People v. Lucas, 180
Ca1.App.2d 723, 726-727 [4 Oal.Rptr. 798] ; People v. King,
175 Oal.App.2d 386,389 [346 P.2d 235] ; People v. Rodriguez,
168 Cal.kpp.2d 452, 457 [336 P.2d 266]; People v. Hicks,
165 Cal.App.2d 548, 550-551 [331 P.2d 1003J ; People v. Melody, 164 Oal.App.2d 728, 734 [331 P.2d 72].) In most of
these cases, however, the language was not necessary to the
decision. It appears to reflect a mechanical extension of the
rule that probable cause to arrest or a warrant is not required
to justify a search when consent to the search is given before
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the officer enters and searches or makes an arrest. (See People
v. Michael, 45 Ca1.2d 751, 754 [290 P.2d 852]; People v.
Burke,47 Ca1.2d 45, 49 [301 P.2d 241].) A search or seizure
made pursuant to a valid consent before any illegal police
conduct occurs is obviously not a product of illegal conduct.
A search and seizure made pursuant to consent secured immediately following an illegal entry or arrest, however, is inextricably bound up with the illegal conduct and cannot be
segregated therefrom. Accordingly, language in the cited
cases to the contrary is disapproved.
[78,] Even if we were to hold that defendant's consent
justified the officers' investigation at the Army Street house
and that the evidence there uncovered constituted reasonable
cause to believe that defendant was guilty of possession of narcotics, the search of the hotel room would nevertheless be
unlawful. If, as defendant contends, he was arrested at the
Army Street house, a search of the hotel room at a distance
therefrom could not be justified as incidental to the arrest.
(Castaneda v. Superior Court, ante, pp. 439, 442 [30 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641]; Tompkins v. Superior Court, ante,
pp. 65, 67 [27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113]; People v.
Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 781 [291 P.2d 469].) If, as the officers
testified, defendant was not arrested until the marijuana was
found in the hotel room, the search could still not be justified as incidental to his arrest. It could not be justified by
what it turned up. (People v. Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640, 643645 [290 P.2d 528]; Tompkins v. Superior Court, ante,
pp. 65, 68 [27 Cal.Rptr. 889, 378 P.2d 113].) Moreover,
even if the officers had probable cause to arrest before discovering the marijuana, they were not entitled to delay making a
formal arrest until they had taken defendant from the house
to the hotel to justify a search of the hotel room as incidental
to an arrest there. "An arrest may not be used as a pretext
to search for evidence." (United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452, 467 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775] ;
People v. Roberts, 47 Ca1.2d 374, 378 [303 P.2d 721] ; People
v. SchaumlofJcJ, 53 Ca1.2d 96,101 [346 P.2d 393].) [8] "It
is settled law that 'when it appears, as it does here, that the
search and not the arrest was the real object of the officers in
entering upon the premises, and that the arrest was a pretext
for or at the most an incident of the search,' the search is
not reasonable within the meaning of the Constitution. Henderson v. United States (4th Cir.) 12 F.2d 528, 531 [51 A.L.R.
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420]." (McKnight v. United States, 183 ~'.2d 977, 9i8.)
[7b] In the present case, the officers did not take defendant
to the hotel and enter the hotel room to arrest him but to conduct a search. The arrest was at most an incident of the
search, and it may not be used as a pretext to justify it.
[9] Accordingly, even if we were to assnme, contrary to our
holding herein, that the finding of the key and the resulting
discovery of the marijuana in the hotel room were not the
product of the unlawful entry into the Army Street house,
the search of the hotel room without a warrant could be
justified only by a valid consent.
Defendant's consent to the search at the Army Street house,
however, was not only vitiated by the unlawful entry, but it
did not even purport to authorize the officers to search the
hotel room. Defendant did not give the officers permission
to search the hotel room or to use his key to gain entrance
thereto, and by attempting to divert them from it, he made it
clear that he did not wish the room searched. In this respect
this case is controlled by Castaneda v. Superior Court,
ante, pp. 439, 443 [30 Cal. Rp tr. 1, 380 P.2d 641], where
we stated: "We do not condone petitioner's efforts to
mislead the officers. It bears emphasis, however, that petitioner was under no duty to assist the officers in securing evidence against him. Since the search was not incident to his
arrest, he had the right to have a magistrate determine
whether there was reasonable cause to search his home and
whether a search warrant should therefore issue. (Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-616 [81 S.Ct. 776, 5
L.Ed.2d 828, 831-833] ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436, 439-440] ; Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 [46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148-149,
51 A.L.R. 409, 413-414].) '''Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haveu for illegal activities.
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy wv,s deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals.'"
(People v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590, 594 [290
P.2d 505J, quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
455 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158].) Petitioner did not
forfeit that right by his efforts to mislead the officers."
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The burden wus on the prosl'cntioll to prove a valid eonsent
to the sl>urch. It failed to disehal'gc that burdcn.
The juugment is revel·sed.
Gibp'm, C. J., Pt'tt>rs,J., 1'obriuer, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
:\IcCOMB, J.-I dissent.
The record in the inst.ant Cm-lll fails to diselose that defendant requested any instructions to the jury, and there has not
bC'E'n prepared and preseuted to this court a copy of any oral
instructions given by tIle trial judge to tIle jury.
'Vhere the instrnctions giwn or refused do not constitute
part of the record, an appellate court will assume tlJat correct instruetions were given to the jury. (Code Civ. Proc ..
§ 1963, subd. 15; People V. Corcllcvsky, 124 Cal.App.2d 19,
24 [10] [267 P.2d 1048] ; l'coplc v. Jack.~on, 88 Cal.App.2d
747,750 [3] [199 P.2d 322J ; 4 Cal.Jur.2<l (1952) Appeal and
Error, § 589, p. 46G; cf. In rc Patte/'son, 58 Cal.2d 848, 853
[7] [27 Ca1.Rptr.10, 377 P.2<1 74J.)
Aecordingly, in additioll to thr evidence set forth by Mr.
Justice Agce in the opinion pl'ppared hy him for the District COllT't of A\ppeal (People V. Ilauen (Cal.App.) 26 Cal.
Rptr. 650), it must be assumed that the trial court fully and
fairly instructed the jUl'Y Oil all llllltprial issuc's presented to
it amI that suell iustruetiom; followed the law. It must also
be presumed that the jury,-in light of all the evidence addueed at the trial, as limited by the court's illstrnctions,d"tp!'mincd the ultimate qu('stions of fact dt·fined by the illt;tl"llctioJll~ as to whether defendant volulltal'ily accompanied
thc police offiecl's to his hotel room and voluntarily permittpd them to searcll it.
It must further be assullled that the jury fairly and imllartially weighed the cvidellce pursuant to the presumptively
comprl'1lCnsive and valid iustructions and found substantial
support for the material findinb"S of fact UpOll which the ultimate admissibility of tllC evidence and, all issues upon which
the jll(lgment of guilty was prNlicatcd. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1!)(i3, subd. 15; People V. 1'arantinf), 45 Ca1.2d 590, 597
[7J [290 P.2d 505J ; People V. Su,tic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 494 [9J
[2(H P.~d 241J.) •
I would th~I"'fol'(~ affirm th!' .judgmcnt.
Schauer, J., concurred.
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